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Abstract: A new standard is proposed for the evidential assessment
of replication studies. The approach combines a specific reverse-Bayes
technique with prior-predictive tail probabilities to define replication
success. The method gives rise to a quantitative measure for rep-
lication success, called the sceptical p-value. The sceptical p-value
integrates traditional significance of both the original and replication
study with a comparison of the respective effect sizes. It incorporates
the uncertainty of both the original and replication effect estimates
and reduces to the ordinary p-value of the replication study if the
uncertainty of the original effect estimate is ignored. The proposed
framework can also be used to determine the power or the required
replication sample size to achieve replication success. Numerical cal-
culations highlight the difficulty to achieve replication success if the
evidence from the original study is only suggestive. An application to
data from the Open Science Collaboration project on the replicability
of psychological science illustrates the proposed methodology.
Key Words: Power; Prior-Data Conflict; Replication Success; Reverse-
Bayes; Sample Size; Sceptical p-value
1. Introduction
Replicability of research findings is crucial to the credibility of all empirical domains
of science. As a consequence of the so-called replication crisis (Ioannidis, 2005; Begley
and Ioannidis, 2015), the past years have witnessed increasing interest in large-scale
replication projects, e. g. Open Science Collaboration (2015); Camerer et al. (2016, 2018).
Such efforts help assess to what extent claims of new discoveries can be confirmed
in independent replication studies whose procedures are as closely matched to the
original studies as possible.
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However, there is no established standard for the statistical evaluation of replication
success. Standard significance of the replication study is often used as a criterion,
but significance alone does not take the effect sizes of the original and replication
study into account and can easily lead to conclusions opposite to what the evidence
warrants (Simonsohn, 2015). A comparison of the effect sizes of the original and rep-
lication study is also common, where a smaller replication effect estimate decreases
the credibility of the original study result. A modification of this is to investigate
whether the replication effect estimate is compatible with the original effect estim-
ate (Bayarri and Mayoral, 2002; Patil et al., 2016). Meta-analytic approaches take the
results from the original and replication study at face value and combine them into
an overall effect size estimate. However, when conducting a replication, researchers
are challenging the original study and asking whether they should take it at face value.
This is an inherently asymmetric question, where exchangeability assumptions are not
appropriate and alternative methods for evidence quantification are needed.
Recently the lack of a single accepted definition of replicability has been emphas-
ized by Goodman et al. (2016) who call for a better understanding of the relationship
between reproducibility and the truth of scientific claims. Researchers have started
to develop Bayesian methods to analyse and design replication studies (Verhagen and
Wagenmakers, 2014; van Aert and van Assen, 2017; Schönbrodt and Wagenmakers,
2018), but there is a lack of appropriate methodology based on traditional metrics
(effect estimates, confidence intervals and p-values). To address this deficiency, I pro-
pose a principled approach, combining the analysis of credibility (Matthews, 2001a,b)
with the prior criticism approach by Box (1980) and Evans and Moshonov (2006) to
define replication success (Section 2). This gives rise to a new quantitative measure of
replication success, the sceptical p-value (Section 3).
The sceptical p-value has attractive properties. It takes into account the results from
both the original and the replication study and is always larger than the ordinary
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p-values from these studies. If the uncertainty of the original effect estimate is ig-
nored, the sceptical p-value reduces to the ordinary p-value from the replication study.
Moreover, the sceptical p-value considers replication studies with relatively small ef-
fect estimates (compared to the original estimates) as less successful. To avoid the
so-called replication paradox (Ly et al., 2018), a one-sided sceptical p-value is derived
within the proposed framework, ensuring that replication success can only occur if the
original and replication effect estimates have the same sign.
Statistical power is of central importance in assessing the reliability of science (But-
ton et al., 2013). Appropriate design of a replication study is key to tackling the
replication crisis as many such studies are currently severely under-powered, even by
traditional standards (Anderson and Maxwell, 2017). Methods to calculate the power
for replication success are proposed in Section 4. Numerical calculations highlight
the difficulty to achieve replication success if the evidence from the original study is
only suggestive. The framework is also used to determine the required sample size to
achieve replication success with appropriate power. Section 5 presents a reanalysis of
data from the Open Science Collaboration (2015) project on the replicability of psycho-
logical science to illustrate the usefulness of the proposed methodology. I close with
some comments in Section 6.
2. Assessment of Replication Success
Analysis of credibility (Matthews, 2001a,b) is a reverse-Bayes procedure originally de-
signed to assess the credibility of significant findings in the light of existing evidence.
The discussion of Matthews (2001b) and the author’s response provide additional in-
sights on the philosophy and detail of this method. The idea to use Bayes’s theorem
in reverse originates in the work of I.J. Good (Good, 1950, 1983) and is increasingly
used to assess the plausibility of scientific findings (Greenland, 2006, 2011; Held, 2013;
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Colquhoun, 2017, 2019).
2.1. Reverse-Bayes Analysis
Analysis of credibility combines a significant effect estimate from the original study
with a sceptical prior (Spiegelhalter et al., 1994, Section 4.1.3), a normal distribution
centered around zero to represent doubts about large effect estimates. A sceptical
prior shrinks the original effect estimate towards zero, where the amount of shrinkage
depends on the sceptical prior variance. Fletcher et al. (1993) have argued for the use
of sceptical priors for original clinical study results, which often show a tendency for
overoptimism.
In order to challenge the original study it is natural to ask how sceptical we would
have to be not to find its apparently positive effect estimate convincing. This leads to a
reverse-Bayes approach, where the posterior is fixed to have a lower (or upper) credible
limit exactly equal to zero and the sceptical prior variance is chosen accordingly. The
approach thus represents the objection by a sceptic who argues that the original result
would no longer be ’significant’ if combined with a sufficiently sceptical prior. The
goal is now to persuade the sceptic by showing that this prior is unrealistic. To do so,
a replication study is conducted. If the data from the replication study are in conflict
with the sufficiently sceptical prior, the original study result is confirmed.
Suppose the original study gives rise to a conventional confidence interval for the
unknown effect size θ at level 1− α with lower limit L and upper limit U. Assume that
L and U are symmetric around the original point estimate θˆo (assumed to be normally
distributed) and that both are either positive or negative, i. e. the original effect is sig-
nificant at significance level α. After a suitable transformation this framework covers
a large number of commonly used effect measures such as differences in means, odds
ratios, relative risks and correlations.
We first need to compute the variance of the sufficiently sceptical prior. Matthews
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(2001a) has shown that the equi-tailed credible interval of the sufficiently sceptical
prior at level 1− α has limits ±S where
S =
(U − L)2
4
√
UL
(1)
is the scepticism limit (Matthews, 2018). Note that (1) holds for any value of α, not just
for the traditional 5% level. The sufficiently sceptical prior variance τ2 can be derived
from (1) and expressed as a function of the variance σ2o (the squared standard error,
assumed to be known) of the estimate θˆo, the corresponding test statistic to = θˆo/σo and
zα/2, the 1− α/2 quantile of the standard normal distribution (Held, 2019, Appendix):
τ2 =
σ2o
t2o/z2α/2 − 1
, (2)
where t2o > z2α/2 holds due to significance of the original study at level α.
Equation (2) shows that the sufficiently sceptical prior variance τ2 can be both smal-
ler or larger than σ2o , depending on the value of t2o . For a “borderline” significant result
where t2o is close to z2α/2, the sufficiently sceptical prior variance will be relatively large.
If t2o is substantially larger than z2α/2, then the sufficiently sceptical prior variance will
be relatively small.
The left part of Figure 1 shows an example of this procedure. The original study has
effect estimate θˆo = 0.57 (95% CI from L = 0.25 to U = 0.89) and two-sided p-value
po = 0.0005. The scepticism limit, calculated from (1), turns out to be S = 0.22.
.
2.2. Assessing Prior-Data Conflict
The replication study shown in the right part of Figure 1 has an effect estimate of
θˆr = 0.33 (95% CI from 0.01 to 0.65, pr = 0.046). If the replication result is in conflict
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Figure 1: Example of the assessment of replication success. The original study has
effect estimate θˆo = 0.57 (95% CI from L = 0.25 to U = 0.89) and two-sided
p-value po = 0.0005. The left part of the figure illustrates the reverse-Bayes
derivation of the sufficiently sceptical prior with scepticism limit S = 0.22
based on the original study result and the posterior with lower credible limit
fixed at zero. The comparison of the sufficiently sceptical prior with the
replication study result (θˆr = 0.33, 95% CI from 0.01 to 0.65, pr = 0.046) in
the right part of the figure is used to assess potential prior-data conflict.
with the sufficiently sceptical prior, the original result is deemed credible. A visual
comparison of the sufficiently sceptical prior with the replication study result in the
right part of Figure 1 can be useful to assess potential conflict, but in general a more
principled statistical approach is needed.
One option is to consider the original study as credible, if the absolute value of
the effect estimate θˆr from the replication study is larger than the scepticism limit S
(Matthews, 2001a,b). In the above example the effect estimate in the replication study
(θˆr = 0.33) is larger than the scepticism limit (S = 0.22), so the original study would
be considered credible at the 5% level. However, a disadvantage of this approach
is that it does not take the (known) variance σ2r of the replication estimate θˆr (in the
following also assumed to be normally distributed) into account. To address this issue,
I propose to quantify prior-data conflict based on the prior-predictive distribution of
θˆr, a normal distribution with mean zero and variance τ2 + σ2r (Spiegelhalter et al.,
2004, Section 5.8). This is the established way to check the compatibility of prior and
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data (Box, 1980; Evans and Moshonov, 2006) and leads to the test statistic
tBox =
θˆr√
τ2 + σ2r
(3)
and the tail probability pBox = Pr(χ2(1) ≥ t2Box) as the corresponding upper tail of a
χ2-distribution with one degree of freedom. Small values of pBox indicate a conflict
between the sufficiently sceptical prior and the estimate from the replication study and
I define replication success at level α if pBox ≤ α, or equivalently t2Box ≥ z2α/2.
In the example shown in Figure 1, the prior-predictive assessment of conflict gives
tBox = 1.65 with Box’s tail probability pBox = 0.098 > 0.05, so the replication study
is not successful at the 5% level, although both the original and the replication study
are significant at that level. This illustrates that replication success is a more stringent
criterion than significance alone. For α = 10%, Box’s tail probability is somewhat
smaller (pBox = 0.078), and we can declare replication success at the 10% level.
The example illustrates how Box’s tail probability can be used to assess replication
success at level α. However, it is difficult to interpret the actual value of pBox as it
depends on the choice of α. Furthermore, assessment of replication success is only
possible if the original study result is significant at level α as otherwise the sufficiently
sceptical prior would not exist and pBox could not be computed. These issues motiv-
ate the work described in the next section where I introduce the sceptical p-value, a
quantitative measure for replication success that is independent of the level α.
3. The Sceptical p-Value
Instead of dichotomizing replication studies into successful yes/no at some arbitrary
level α, I now propose the sceptical p-value pS to assess replication success quantit-
atively. The idea is to determine the largest confidence level 1− pS for the original
confidence interval, at which we are able to declare replication success at level pS.
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This parallels the duality of ordinary p-values and confidence intervals, where the
largest confidence level 1− p at which we are able to declare significance can be used
to compute the ordinary p-value p. Replication success at any pre-specified level α is
then equivalent to pS ≤ α, just as significance at level α is equivalent to p ≤ α.
To determine pS, let c = σ2o /σ2r denote the ratio of the variances of the original and
replication effect estimates and let tr = θˆr/σr denote the test statistic of the replication
study. With (2) we can derive the prior-predictive variance of θˆr:
τ2 + σ2r = σ
2
r
(
c
t2o/z2α/2 − 1
+ 1
)
. (4)
Using (3) and (4), the requirement t2Box = θˆ
2
r /(τ2 + σ2r ) ≥ z2α/2 for replication success
at level α can be written as
(
t2o/z
2
α/2 − 1
) (
t2r/z
2
α/2 − 1
) ≥ c, (5)
see Appendix A for a derivation. Significance of the original study implies that z2α/2 <
t2o holds, therefore z2α/2 < t
2
r must also hold to ensure that the left hand side of equation
(5) is positive. The required squared quantile z2S = z
2
pS/2
to obtain equality in (5) must
therefore fulfill
0 ≤ z2S < min{t2o , t2r} (6)
and defines the sceptical p-value pS = 2 [1−Φ(zS)] via
(
t2o/z
2
S − 1
) (
t2r/z
2
S − 1
)
= c. (7)
The requirement pS ≤ α for replication success at level α now translates to z2S ≥ z2α/2.
Equation (7) can be re-written as
(c− 1)z4S + 2z2S t2A = t2A t2H, (8)
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where t2A = (t
2
o + t2r )/2 is the arithmetic and t2H = 2/(1/t
2
o + 1/t2r ) the harmonic mean
of the squared test statistics t2o and t2r . The only solution of (8) that fulfills (6) is
z2S =
 t
2
H/2 for c = 1 and
1
c−1
{√
t2A
[
t2A + (c− 1)t2H
]− t2A} for c 6= 1. (9)
In the introductory example the original and the replication confidence intervals
have the same width, so c = 1 and z2S is simply half the harmonic mean of t
2
o = 12.19
and t2r = 3.99, i. e. z2S = 3.00, |zS| = 1.73 and pS = 2 [1−Φ(1.73)] = 0.083. We can thus
declare replication success at any pre-specified level α ≥ 0.083.
3.1. Properties
Inequation (6) implies that the sceptical p-value pS is always larger than both the
original and the replication p-values po and pr. Closer inspection of equation (7) shows
that z2S is increasing with increasing t
2
o (for fixed t2r and c) and also with increasing t2r
(for fixed t2o and c). Therefore, the smaller po (or pr), the smaller pS (for fixed c).
Furthermore, for fixed test statistics to and tr (so fixed p-values po and pr), the solution
z2S of (7) will decrease with increasing variance ratio
c =
σ2o
σ2r
=
t2r/t2o
θˆ2r /θˆ2o
Since t2r/t2o is fixed, c increases with decreasing squared effect size ratio θˆ2r /θˆ2o . In other
words, for the same ordinary p-values po and pr, the sceptical p-value pS increases with
decreasing absolute replication effect estimate relative to the original effect estimate.
This is a desired property, as replication studies with smaller effect estimates than the
original estimates are considered less credible (Simonsohn, 2015).
To illustrate the dependence of pS on the variance ratio c, consider a scenario where
po = pr = 0.01, so t2o = t2r and therefore c = θˆ2o/θˆ2r . First assume equal effect sizes
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θˆr = θˆo, so c = 1. The sceptical p-value turns out to be pS = 0.069. For θˆr = θˆo/2 (c = 4)
we obtain a larger value (pS = 0.14) because the effect estimate θˆr of the replication
study is just half as large as the original estimate θˆo. On the other hand, for θˆr = 2 θˆo
(c = 1/4) the sceptical p-value gets smaller (pS = 0.035). This asymmetry in the
incorporation of the original and replication study data is natural, placing less weight
on replication studies with relatively small effect estimates. This is the case in the
introductory example, where substantial shrinkage of the replication effect estimate
leads to a relatively large sceptical p-value.
It is also interesting to study limiting values of the sceptical p-value. If we let σ2o ↓ 0
for fixed θˆo 6= 0, (8) reduces to the requirement z2S = t2r , as shown in Appendix B. Thus,
the ordinary p-value of the replication study is a special case of the sceptical p-value if
the uncertainty of the original effect estimate is ignored. On the other hand, ignoring
the uncertainty of θˆr 6= 0 via σ2r ↓ 0 leads to z2S ↓ z2M where
z2M =
√
d (d+ 4)− d
2
t2o , (10)
with d = θˆ2r /θˆ2o , see Appendix B for a proof. Using the criterion z2M ≥ z2α/2 rather than
z2S ≥ z2α/2 to assess replication success corresponds to the Matthews (2001a,b) approach
mentioned in Section 2.2. For any value of d, z2M is smaller than t
2
o but can be larger
than t2r . Ignoring the uncertainty of the replication effect estimate may thus lead to the
declaration of replication success, even if the replication study is not conventionally
significant on its own.
We may also consider the case c ↓ 0 for fixed t2o and t2r , where (9) increases with limit
z2S ↑ min{t2o , t2r}, (11)
as shown in Appendix C. Therefore pS ↓ max{po, pr} for c ↓ 0, which we will use in
Section 3.4.
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3.2. Relationship to Intrinsic Credibility
The concept of intrinsic credibility has been proposed in Matthews (2018) to check
the credibility of "out of the blue" findings without any prior support. In the present
context this corresponds to an original study in the absence of a replication study. The
idea is to evaluate the credibility of the original study if we would be able to observe
exactly the same result in the replication study.
The approach by Matthews (2018) corresponds to the case where we ignore the
uncertainty of the (hypothetical) replication study and thus leads to (10) with d = 1:
z2M = (
√
5− 1)/2 t2o ≈ 0.618 t2o . However, if we incorporate the uncertainty using the
prior-predictive approach by Box (1980), then we obtain z2S = 0.5 t
2
o as a special case of
(9) for c = 1 and t2o = t2r . Now pS reduces to the p-value for intrinsic credibility,
pIC = 2
[
1−Φ
(
to/
√
2
)]
, (12)
as proposed in Held (2019) for the assessment of claims of new discoveries. Intrinsic
credibility at level α is achieved if pIC ≤ α, i. e. t2o ≥ 2 z2α/2, which is equivalent to
po ≤ αIC, where
αIC = 2
{
1−Φ
(√
2 zα/2
)}
(13)
is the p-value threshold for intrinsic credibility. For α = 0.05 we obtain αIC = 0.0056,
for α = 0.10 we have αIC = 0.02. These thresholds will become important in Section 4.
3.3. One-Sided Sceptical p-Values
The procedure described above is designed for standard two-sided confidence inter-
vals and assesses replication success in a two-sided fashion, as the sign of θˆr does not
matter in the computation of the sceptical p-value. In extreme cases, it may therefore
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happen that a replication study is classified as successful although the signs of θˆo and
θˆr differ. This “replication paradox” may also occur in a Bayes factor approach, see Ly
et al. (2018) for details.
It is therefore of interest to adapt the sceptical p-value to the one-sided setting.
Without loss of generality consider the one-sided alternative H1: θ > 0 to H0: θ = 0
and assume, that θˆo > 0. We now start with a one-sided confidence interval for θ at
level 1− α˜ whose lower limit θˆo − zα˜ σo equals the lower limit L of the correspond-
ing two-sided confidence interval at level 1− 2α˜. The variance τ2 of the sufficiently
sceptical prior therefore is (2) with zα/2 replaced by zα˜.
The obvious one-sided requirement for replication success tBox = θˆr/
√
τ2 + σ2r ≥ zα˜
now replaces the two-sided requirement t2Box ≥ z2α/2 and ensures that the replication
paradox cannot occur. If θˆr ≥ 0, we can hence still use (9) to compute z2S from to, tr
and c and the one-sided sceptical p-value turns out to be p˜S = 1− Φ(zS), so half of
the two-sided sceptical p-value: p˜S = pS/2. If the replication effect estimate is in the
wrong direction, i. e. θˆr < 0, it is natural to set p˜S = 1− pS/2. The same relationship
holds between ordinary one- and two-sided p-values, of course, which implies that the
one-sided sceptical p-value p˜S is always larger than the ordinary one-sided p-values
p˜o and p˜r from the two studies.
One-sided sceptical p-values are appropriate if the study protocol of the original
study is already formulated in a one-sided fashion. A post-hoc (after the original
study result is known) formulation of a one-sided alternative would require halving
the original two-sided significance level α to α˜ = α/2. The one-sided assessment
of replication success at level α˜ is then equivalent to the two-sided procedure at the
original level α, if the signs of the original and replication effect estimates agree. This
procedure ensures that the replication paradox cannot occur.
However, the one-sided p-value mapping (from p˜o and p˜r to p˜S) will be different
from the corresponding two-sided mapping (from po and pr to pS) because the same
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ordinary one- and two-sided p-values correspond to different test statistics to and
tr. For numerical illustration suppose that p˜o = p˜r = 0.01 (so po = pr = 0.02 and
to = tr = 2.33) and that θˆo and θˆr are both positive. Then p˜S = 0.05 for c = 1, p˜S = 0.09
for c = 4 and p˜S = 0.029 for c = 1/4. These one-sided sceptical p-values are slightly
smaller than the two-sided sceptical p-values for two-sided po = pr = 0.01 (where
to = tr = 2.58), as reported in Section 3.1 (pS = 0.069, 0.14 and 0.035 for c = 1, 4
and 1/4, respectively). This illustrates that the one-sided assessment of replication
success based on one-sided ordinary p-values is slightly less stringent than the two-
sided assessment based on two-sided ordinary p-values, if the original and replication
effect estimates have the same sign.
3.4. The Distribution Under The Null
It is interesting to compare the distributions of po (or pr), pIC and pS under the
assumption of no effect, where the ordinary p-value is uniformly distributed. We
can easily derive the density of pIC with a change-of-variables using (12): f (pIC) =
2
√
pi ϕ {t(pIC)}, here ϕ(.) is the standard normal density function and t(pIC) = Φ−1(1−
pIC/2).
The distribution of pS can be studied via stochastic simulation. Density estimates
are displayed in Figure 2 for different values of the variance ratio c based on 5× 106
samples each. We can see that the risk of small “false positive” sceptical p-values is
drastically reduced, compared to ordinary p-values based on one study only. Note
that the variance is usually inversely proportional to the sample size of each study,
i. e. σ2o = κ2/no and σ2r = κ2/nr for some unit variance κ2, say. Then c = nr/no, so
the variance factor c is increasing with increasing sample size nr of the replication
study. The distribution of pS in Figure 2 is shifted to the right with increasing c, so
an increasing sample size of the replication study reduces the risk of a false claim of
replication success.
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Figure 2: The density function of the sceptical p-value for different values of the vari-
ance ratio c under the assumption of no effect. The density for the limiting
case c → 0 as well as the density of the p-value for intrinsic credibility and
the ordinary p-value are also shown.
From (11) we know that for c ↓ 0 we have pS ↓ max{po, pr}, which follows a trian-
gular Be(2, 1) distribution if pr and po are independently uniform. The correspond-
ing density function is shown in Figure 2, as well as the density function of po and
pIC. The triangular distribution gives the upper bound α2 for the tail probability
Pr(pS ≤ α |H0) for sufficiently small α and any value of the variance ratio c. For ex-
ample, for α = 0.05 we obtain Pr(pS ≤ 0.05 |H0) ≤ 0.0025 for any c. This is to be
compared with Pr(po ≤ 0.05 |H0) = 0.05 and Pr(pIC ≤ 0.05 |H0) = 0.0056. However,
α2 is not a particularly sharp bound. If, for example, the replication sample size equals
the original sample size (c = 1), then Pr(pS ≤ 0.05 |H0) ≈ 0.0001 is much smaller than
0.0025.
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4. Power and Sample Size Calculations
Replication success is not only a function of the two p-values from the original and
replication study, but also of sample size, which enters in the variance ratio c. The
computation of the power or the required replication sample size to achieve replication
success is hence more challenging than in standard sample size calculations. A larger
sample size will be required since replication success (defined as pS ≤ α) implies
significance of the replication study (pr ≤ α). Furthermore, the required sample size
will depend on the p-value po from the original study.
The Bayesian assessment of sample size uses a design prior (O’Hagan and Stevens,
2001; O'Hagan et al., 2005) to express prior beliefs about the true effect size. In order
to power a study for replication success, the results from the original study will thus
enter in two ways, as design prior for the effect size and in the subsequent assessment
of replication success. For the former I will distinguish two cases, a normal prior
with mean θˆo and variance σ2o and a point prior at θˆo. The normal prior incorporates
the uncertainty of θˆo while the point prior does not, in analogy to the concepts of
predictive and conditional power in clinical trials (Spiegelhalter and Freedman, 1986;
Spiegelhalter et al., 1986).
Suppose no is the size of the original study sample and nr the sample size of the
replication study, so σ2o = κ2/no and σ2r = κ2/nr, where κ2 is the unit variance from
one observation. Then c = nr/no, which would also hold in a balanced two-sample
design with respective sample sizes no and nr per group. Under an initial uniform
prior for θ, the sampling distribution θˆo ∼ N(θ, σ2o ) of the original study now serves as
prior distribution θ | θˆo ∼ N
(
θˆo, σ2o
)
with prior-predictive distribution
θˆr | θˆo ∼ N
(
θˆo, σ2o + σ
2
r = κ
2
{
1
no
+
1
nr
})
(14)
for the observed effect θˆr in the replication study. Then t2r follows a scaled non-central
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χ2-distribution with one degree of freedom, scaling factor 1 + c and non-centrality
parameter t2o/(1 + 1/c), as shown in Appendix D. For the alternative point prior at
θ = θˆo, t2r follows a non-central χ2-distribution with one degree of freedom and non-
centrality parameter λ = c t2o .
To compute the power for replication success, the relative sample size c = nr/no in
(9) is fixed. Then z2S and the sceptical p-value pS are monotone functions of t
2
r and we
can compute the power for replication success at any level α. We can also calculate
the required relative sample size c = nr/no at some pre-defined power for replication
success. Both tasks require application of numerical root-finding algorithms. Compu-
tational details are omitted here.
4.1. Power calculations
Figure 3 compares the power for significance with the power for replication success for
a replication study with sample size equal to the original study (c = 1) at level α = 5%
as a function of the two-sided p-value po of the original study. Power calculations for
significance aim to detect the effect estimate θˆo from the original study with a standard
two-sided significance test. Not accounting for the associated uncertainty corresponds
to the concept of conditional power, whereas predictive power calculations are based
on a normal design prior with mean θˆo and variance σ2o (Spiegelhalter et al., 2004,
Equation 6.4). The results are in accordance with those reported in Goodman (1992).
In particular, for po = 0.05 the power is 50% both for conditional and predictive power
with conditional power increasing faster than predictive power for smaller p-values
po.
Conditional and predictive power for replication success is also shown in Figure 3
for two-sided α = 5% respectively one-sided α˜ = 5%. As expected, the power for
replication success is lower than for significance, and drops quickly to zero for values
of po close to 0.05. Remarkably, in the two-sided case, a conditional and predictive
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Figure 3: Power calculations for a replication study with sample size equal to the ori-
ginal study (c = 1). Shown is conditional and predictive power for signi-
ficance (two-sided) and for replication success (one- and two-sided) at level
α = 5% as a function of the two-sided p-value of the original study. The one-
and two-sided thresholds for intrinsic credibility are marked in red on the
x-axis.
power of 50% is attained at po = 0.0056. This is the threshold (13) for intrinsic cred-
ibility at level α = 5%, as described in Section 3.2. In the one-sided case a power of
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50% is obtained at po = 0.02, the threshold for intrinsic credibility at two-sided level
α = 10%. Therefore, only intrinsically credible results (based on the threshold (13))
ensure that the power for success of an identically designed replication study exceeds
50%. This intriguing feature highlights the difficulty to achieve replication success if
the evidence from the original study is only suggestive and provides a new argument
for more stringent p-value thresholds for claims of new discoveries (Johnson, 2013;
Benjamin et al., 2018; Ioannidis, 2018; Held, 2019).
This surprising result can be explained as follows: If the non-centrality parameter
λ of a non-central χ2(1)-distribution is reasonably large, say λ > 4, then the median
is approximately equal to λ. Under the point prior and for c = 1, the non-centrality
parameter of the distribution of t2r is λ = t2o , so Med(t2r ) ≈ t2o . The sceptical p-value
pS = 2 [1−Φ(zS)] is then defined through z2S = t2H/2 = (1/t2o+ 1/t2r )−1, so the median
of z2S is approximately t
2
o/2. Replication success is thus achieved with 50% probability
for z2α/2 = z
2
S ≈ t2o/2, i. e. t2o ≈ 2 z2α/2. This corresponds to the intrinsic credibility
threshold (13) for the ordinary p-value po from the original study.
We obtain essentially the same result under the normal prior, where now λ = t2o/2,
which combined with a scaling factor of 2 also leads to Med(t2r ) ≈ t2o for sufficiently
large t2o . The rest of the argument is as above, but note that this approximation is
slightly less precise, because the non-centrality parameter is half as large than under
the point prior. The approximation is, however, still very good: For α = 5%, the exact
power for replication success at po = 2[1− Φ(
√
2 z0.025)] is 50.00001% for the point
prior and 50.00459% for the normal prior.
4.2. Sample size calculations
Figure 4 compares different strategies to determine the replication sample size for
two-sided α = 5% respectively one-sided α˜ = 5% and original two-sided p-values po
between 0.0001 and 0.05. The power to achieve significance respectively replication
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Figure 4: Relative sample size c = nr/no to achieve significance (two-sided) and replic-
ation success (one- and two-sided) with 80% conditional or predictive power
for α = 0.05 as a function of the original two-sided p-value po. The one- and
two-sided thresholds for intrinsic credibility are marked in red on the x-axis.
success is fixed at 80%.
Standard (two-sided) sample size calculations based on conditional power give relat-
ive sample sizes between 0.52 and 2, depending on the p-value po of the original study.
Incorporating the uncertainty from the original study based on predictive power gives
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relative sample sizes between 0.61 and 3.7.
The required relative sample size for two-sided replication success is larger than
the one for significance alone and depends more drastically on the p-value po of the
original study. First consider the case of conditional power. If po is smaller than
0.001, the required relative sample size c is smaller one, so the replication sample
size nr does not need to be larger than the original sample size no. However, the
required sample size explodes for larger p-values with an asymptote around po =
0.012. This highlights the difficulty to achieve 80% power for replication success with
original p-values between 0.01 and 0.05. Even larger sample sizes are required based
on predictive rather than conditional power with an asymptote around po = 0.005.
The curves shift a little to the right when we assess replication success in a one-sided
fashion, pushing the asymptotes towards po = 0.035 for conditional and po = 0.017
for predictive power. The predictive power asymptotes are remarkably close to the
corresponding thresholds 0.0056 and 0.02 for intrinsic credibility, also shown in Figure
4. Of course, the asymptotes would change for power values different from 80%.
5. Replication Success in Psychological Science
I now re-analyse data from the Open Science Collaboration (2015) project, a multi-
year endeavour that replicated 100 scientific studies selected from three prominent
psychology journals. Effect sizes have been transformed to correlation coefficients
ρˆ where application of Fisher’s z-transformation θˆ = tanh−1(ρˆ) justifies a normal
assumption with the standard error being a function only of the nominal study sample
size n: se(θˆ) = 1/
√
n− 3, so the effective sample size is n − 3 with variance ratio
c = (nr − 3)/(no − 3). Effective sample sizes are available for 73 studies, the so-called
Meta-Analytic subset (Johnson et al., 2016). Two-sided p-values po and pr have been
calculated assuming normality of the corresponding test statistics to = θˆo/ se(θˆo) and
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tr = θˆr/ se(θˆr), respectively. I have not included the remaining 27 studies where a
normal approximation is questionable since the standard errors of θˆo and θˆr are not
available.
Figure 5 displays the replication versus the original correlation estimates. Eight
of the 73 original studies are not significant at the standard α = 5% level, three of
them with p-values between 0.05 and 0.06. There have been 21 significant replication
studies following from the 65 significant original studies. The sceptical p-value allows
us to rank the studies by the degree of replication success. Table 1 lists the 24 most
successful replication studies with pS ≤ 0.15 of which the top 11 have been successful
at the two-sided 5% level (pS ≤ 0.05). The remaining 13 studies in Table 1 (with
pS > 0.05) show some interesting features. For example, study 18 has a non-significant
replication result but still leads to replication success at the 10% level. Conversely,
there are several studies with both po ≤ 0.05 and pr ≤ 0.05 but pS > 0.10. This
illustrates once again, that the sceptical p-value does not only take significance of the
original and replication study into account, but also effect and sample sizes, both
entering in the variance ratio c.
6. Discussion
Science would proceed more efficiently if statistical approaches to inference are better
aligned with scientific needs and practice (Goodman, 2016). The traditional dichotomy
between ’Bayesians’ and ’frequentists’ may not always be useful to achieve this goal.
The proposed approach follows the spirit of “evolution rather than revolution” (Mat-
thews, 2018) and provides a framework for extracting more insight from replication
studies based on standard metrics (effect estimates, confidence intervals and p-values).
Instead of synthesising original and replication study results through a meta-analysis,
the original study result is challenged with the sufficiently sceptical prior. Replica-
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Figure 5: Application to Open Science Collaboration (2015) data: The circles represent
the effect estimates (correlations) of original and replication studies. The
circle size represents the predictive power for replication success at the two-
sided 5% level. Replication success and significance is also assessed at the
two-sided 5% level and indicated by the color of the circles.
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Original study Replication study Replication Success
no ρˆo po nr ρˆr pr Power pS
1 126 0.68 < 0.0001 177 0.76 < 0.0001 > 99.9 < 0.0001
2 78 0.77 < 0.0001 38 0.65 < 0.0001 > 99.9 < 0.0001
3 30 0.70 < 0.0001 31 0.78 < 0.0001 95.3 0.0005
4 174 0.29 0.0001 141 0.32 < 0.0001 82.6 0.005
5 32 0.57 0.0005 32 0.65 < 0.0001 78.7 0.007
6 22 0.71 < 0.0001 22 0.68 0.0003 87.6 0.008
7 38 0.62 < 0.0001 39 0.48 0.002 93.7 0.011
8 30 0.69 < 0.0001 27 0.53 0.004 92.1 0.015
9 117 0.21 0.023 236 0.50 < 0.0001 14.0 0.033
10 23 0.67 0.0003 31 0.47 0.007 88.4 0.038
11 9 0.72 0.026 18 0.92 < 0.0001 9.3 0.048
12 154 0.36 < 0.0001 50 0.28 0.045 69.7 0.052
13 40 0.37 0.017 95 0.41 < 0.0001 29.0 0.06
14 11 0.70 0.014 11 0.75 0.006 28.9 0.067
15 25 0.59 0.001 33 0.40 0.022 76.7 0.072
16 41 0.52 0.0004 41 0.32 0.044 79.6 0.08
17 9 0.74 0.021 16 0.70 0.002 18.9 0.091
18 33 0.56 0.0005 21 0.40 0.071 64.5 0.096
19 33 0.38 0.029 72 0.38 0.0009 4.3 0.10
20 25 0.45 0.025 39 0.42 0.007 10.9 0.10
21 57 0.33 0.011 118 0.23 0.014 44.5 0.11
22 96 0.20 0.057 243 0.25 < 0.0001 0.0 0.12
23 16 0.65 0.005 13 0.50 0.085 45.9 0.13
24 69 0.35 0.003 178 0.15 0.045 78.0 0.14
Table 1: Results for the 24 most successful replication studies with pS ≤ 0.15, as listed
in the last column. The penultimate column gives the predictive power for
replication success (in %) at level α = 5%.
tion success is then defined as conflict between the sufficiently sceptical prior and the
replication effect estimate. While the ordinary p-value quantifies the conflict between
the point null hypothesis and the replication data, the sceptical p-value quantifies the
conflict between the sufficiently sceptical prior and the replication data. It extends
the ordinary p-value of the replication study by taking into account effect and sample
sizes of the two studies.
Just as the ordinary p-value is an indirect measure of the evidence against the null
hypothesis, the sceptical p-value is an indirect measure of the degree of replication
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success. Specifically, a large sceptical p-value can occur if the replication sample size
was too small, even if original and replication effect sizes are approximately equal,
and should not be taken as evidence for no effect (Altman and Bland, 1995). This is
not the only reason why it would be interesting to compare the sceptical p-value to
direct “forward-Bayes” approaches, such as the replication Bayes Factor (Verhagen and
Wagenmakers, 2014; Ly et al., 2018), which quantifies the change in evidence brought
about by observing the results from the replication study, given that the evidence from
the original study is already available.
Significance of both the original and the replication study is a necessary but not
sufficient requirement for replication success. The proposed framework thus extends
the “two pivotal study paradigm” requiring two significant findings from two inde-
pendent confirmatory trials for regulatory drug approval, see Kennedy-Shaffer (2017)
for a recent review. However, the difficulty to achieve replication success if the evid-
ence from the original study is only suggestive underlines the need for more stringent
p-value thresholds for claims of new discoveries. The threshold for intrinsic credibility
(13) is a natural choice for this task.
It would be interesting to extend the approach to a setting where several replication
studies are available. For example, a summary estimate based on a meta-analysis of all
available replication studies may be used to assess replication success. If results from
replication studies become sequentially available, an alternative approach is to com-
bine original and replication effect estimates into an overall summary measure. Some
down-weighting of the original study result would in general be required depending
on the degree of replication success. The overall estimate could then be used as a new
“original” effect estimate in order to assess the success of a second replication study.
This would open up new ways to iteratively challenge existing knowledge through a
series of replication studies and would provide an interesting alternative to traditional
evidence synthesis methods.
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The proposed reverse-Bayes approach assumes a simple mathematical framework,
where likelihood, prior and posterior are all assumed to be normal. It will be of
interest to extend this framework to other settings, for example to the t-distribution.
Data and Software Availability Data analyzed in this article are originally from
Open Science Collaboration (2015) and have been downloaded from https://osf.io/
fgjvw/. Software to compute the sceptical p-value and the power or required sample
size to achieve replication success are available in the R-package pCalibrate available
on the Comprehensive R Archive Network (https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=
pCalibrate).
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Appendix
A. Proof of equation (5)
We have
t2Box =
θˆ2r
τ2 + σ2r
=
θˆ2r
σ2r
(
c
t2o/z2α/2 − 1
+ 1
)−1
= t2r
(
t2o/z2α/2 − 1
c+ t2o/z2α/2 − 1
)
,
so the requirement t2Box ≥ z2α/2 for replication success at level α is equivalent to
t2r
z2α/2
(
t2o
z2α/2
− 1
)
≥ c+ t2o/z2α/2 − 1.
Subtracting t2o/z2α/2 − 1 on both sides leads to (5).
B. The limiting cases σ2o ↓ 0 and σ2r ↓ 0
Equation (8) can be re-written as
c− 1
t2A
z4S + 2 z
2
S = t
2
H, (15)
where
c− 1
t2A
=
σ2o − σ2r
σ2r
2
t2o + t2r
=
2 σ2o (σ2o − σ2r )
θˆ2oσ
2
r + θˆ
2
rσ
2
o
.
For σ2o ↓ 0 we thus have (c− 1)/t2A → 0 and t2H → 2 t2r so equation (15) reduces to
2 z2S = 2 t
2
r and hence z2S = t
2
r . For σ2r ↓ 0 we have (c− 1)/t2A → (2 σ2o )/θˆ2r and t2H → 2 t2o
so equation (15) reduces to (σ2o /θˆ2r ) z4S + z
2
S = t
2
o . The solution of this equation is
z2S =
θˆ2r
2 σ2o
{√
1+ 4σ2o t2o/θˆ2r − 1
}
=
θˆ2r
2 σ2o
{√
1+ 4/d− 1
}
=
θˆ2o
2 σ2o
{√
d2 + 4 d− d
}
=
t2o
2
{√
d(d+ 4)− d
}
,
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which is equation (10) with d = θˆ2r /θˆ2o .
C. Proof of result (11)
Equation (9) reduces for c ↓ 0 to
z2S = t
2
A −
√
t2A
[
t2A − t2H
]
= t2A −
√
t2A
2
(t2o − t2r )2
t2o + t2r
= t2A −
∣∣t2o − t2r ∣∣
2
= min{t2o , t2r}.
The derivative of (9) with respect to c is (for c 6= 1)
d z2S
d c
= − 1
c− 1
{
z2S −
1
2
t2At
2
H
(c− 1)z2S + t2A
}
= − z
2
S
c− 1
{
1− 1
2
(c− 1)z2S + 2 t2A
(c− 1)z2S + t2A
}
= −1
2
z4S
(c− 1)z2S + t2A
(16)
where the middle line follows from (8) and the last line also holds for c = 1. It is easy
to see from (9) that (c− 1)z2S + t2A > 0 for all c, and therefore (16) is negative for all c.
D. Proof of results in Section 4
For notational simplicity I omit the conditioning on θˆo in the following. Equation (14)
implies a distribution on tr = θˆr/σr =
√
nr θˆr/κ,
tr ∼ N
(
√
nr
θˆo
κ
,
no + nr
no
)
,
so tr =
√
(no + nr)/no t˜r where
t˜r ∼ N
(√
nonr
no + nr
θˆo
κ
, 1
)
.
Therefore t2r = (no + nr)/no · t˜2r follows a scaled non-central χ2-distribution with 1
degree of freedom, scaling factor (no + nr)/no = 1+ c and non-centrality parameter
λ = (nonr)/(no + nr) · θˆ2o/κ2 = t2o/(1+ 1/c).
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Things simplify somewhat for a point prior θ = θˆo at the estimate from the original
study. Then θˆr | θˆo ∼ N
(
θˆo, κ2/nr
)
so tr ∼ N
(√
nr θˆo/κ, 1
)
. Now t2r follows a non-
central χ2-distribution with 1 degree of freedom and non-centrality parameter λ =
nr θˆ2o/κ2 = c t2o .
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